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**Foreign  
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# **International Narcotics Biweekly Review**

**19 July 1978**

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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS BIWEEKLY REVIEW

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Turkish press reports tend to confirm earlier indications that the Turkish Government would soon act to reduce the total area under opium poppy cultivation to keep it in line with the capacity of the opium poppy straw processing plant nearing completion in southern Turkey.

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This publication is prepared by analysts in the National Foreign Assessment Center for specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international narcotics matters. Comments and queries are welcome.

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WESTERN EUROPE: Prospects for Cooperation  
on Drug Control

The fourth ministerial-level conference of the principal West European states on prospects for cooperation in combating drug abuse and illicit trafficking in narcotics took place last week in Stockholm. After a one-day session, the conference concluded that "in most countries of the region, the situation has not improved but is worsening."

Although the conference is the result of a proposal of the late President Pompidou, France has not played a particularly constructive role. The French thwarted a Swedish-Dutch bid to have US and Canadian observers at the Stockholm meeting but were isolated in their preference for bilateral assistance to developing states for drug production control. This emphasis on bilateralism and on limiting the US role in what it sees as West European projects--however irritating in this instance for France's partners--is a standard element of the French approach to international relations.

The conference was also unable to agree on the desirability of applying pressure on drug-producing states that are near the USSR and vulnerable to Soviet influence.

Because of the lack of agreement on tackling the drug supply issue it appears likely that increasing attention will be given to drug abuse. Two or three expert-level meetings on drug abuse are to be held before the ministers reconvene next year.

Despite the limited progress, the forum is considered valuable by the participants because it has increased the exchange of information and could lead to a more uniform structuring of the West Europeans' handling of narcotics problems.

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TURKEY: Government Plans To Decrease Poppy Production

The Turkish press reports that the government will make a decision this month on measures to decrease the area of poppy production while increasing the quality of the poppy capsule itself. The Ministry of Agriculture is recommending that the poppy cultivation area be limited to 98,800 acres (40,000 hectares) for the 1978-79 growing season. Although about 100,000 hectares were licensed for this year, it is estimated that only 50,000 hectares of poppies will actually be harvested.

According to the Minister of Agriculture current world production of licit opium has increased to a level in excess of world demand. Thousands of tons of Turkey's opium capsule stocks remain in storage, and the quality is declining. He added that future production should be limited to 20,000 tons yearly. The area permitted under the proposed restrictions should be sufficient to produce this amount, assuming an average yield. The target capacity of the alkaloids factory currently under construction in southwestern Turkey is 20,000 tons. It is expected to be operational by early 1979.

Officials of the Soil Products Office (TMO) have suggested that planting permits issued to farmers reduce the authorized area from 1 1/4 acres (5 decares) to 1/2 acre (2 decares). However, a government decree is necessary to authorize this reduction. Since the application period for planting permits will begin soon, the decree will have to be issued within the next month.

To maintain quality of the capsules, the TMO will discontinue the practice of buying all poppies near the top of the pricing scale. Poorer quality poppies will now be purchased at lower prices.

Economic factors may have influenced the government's decision to decrease planting as a reduction of the area under cultivation will help stem lira losses from poppy purchases by the government.

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ECUADOR: Continuing Drug Control Efforts

After meeting earlier this year in Ecuador with a team of US representatives, President Poveda launched a "war on drugs." Since then new and more effective legal procedures have been implemented, and some enforcement capabilities have been improved. Even so, US Embassy officials in Quito believe that more can and should be done--particularly to improve the inadequate narcotics enforcement by the National Police and Customs Military Police.

The National Police thus far have failed to carry out their detector dog program and have improperly utilized equipment provided by the US. According to US Embassy statistics, narcotics seizures by the Customs Military Police have declined for the second consecutive year.

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In spite of these and other problems, there are still some encouraging signs for drug control in Ecuador. Major Lopez Espinoza--a blatantly corrupt official who has been deeply involved with drug traffickers--was recently dismissed as chief of the Quito Narcotics Police Division. He has been replaced by Major Gustavo Gallegos, a police officer with an excellent service record in the Ecuadorean Criminal Investigation Service.

Since assuming control, Gallegos has increased the working hours of all his police agents and has

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assigned specific narcotics cases to teams of agents, insisting that his men provide him with periodic written progress reports. In addition, he is attempting to institute an internal inspector general team within his command to supervise the activities of his police agents.

These changes will neither drastically nor immediately affect Ecuador's drug control capabilities. Even small improvements, however, are important and necessary if the country's various enforcement agencies are ever to do a more effective job in stemming the flow of narcotics through Ecuador.

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NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

(Editor's Note: These items, produced for other CIA publications, do not deal specifically with the international narcotics situation. They are included here because they concern developing situations that could impact on the international narcotics control effort.)



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BOLIVIA: Election Aftermath

The Bolivian Government's interference in the presidential election held on 9 July is creating unforeseen difficulties and may yet backfire. The government candidate, Juan Pereda, will have great difficulty in governing if elected, and, at worst, he could face a coup.

The major opposition candidates have reacted bitterly to the regime's blatant rigging of the balloting and are threatening to join forces to hamstring Pereda if he is elected. With about 70 percent of the votes counted, Pereda has just over half. The opposition candidates' threat is a credible one because the parties backing them are apparently doing well in the congressional balloting. The defeated contenders are thus likely to be able to frustrate Pereda by directing their congressional delegations to withhold support. This would almost certainly force Pereda to attempt to govern by repressive means, destroying prospects for a "return to democracy," for which the election allegedly was a prelude. If Pereda were to take repressive measures, however, it is questionable whether the armed forces--on which he would have to rely--would support him; although the military sponsored Pereda, he does not enjoy wide support among officers. His government could thus easily fall, and ambitious generals would vie for power.

Ironically, Pereda might well have won without resorting to fraud. It now appears that many of the votes going to the opposition were cast to protest the coercive preelection tactics the regime used to assure a favorable outcome.



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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Controversy

Antonio Guzman has been officially certified as president-elect of the Dominican Republic, but he has lost political ground because of the recent decision by the Central Electoral Commission to strip his party of the Senate majority it apparently won in the 16 May national election. Guzman will apparently accept the commission's decision, however, rather than risk losing the presidency in an open confrontation with the military.

The embattled commission tried to end seven weeks of legal and administrative haggling by compromise. It refused to call a new election as Balaguer's Reformist Party demanded, dismissed charges of fraud against Guzman's center-left party, and certified Guzman's election and his party's control of the lower house. But it also transformed what had been a three-seat Senate majority for Guzman's party into a five-seat advantage for the Reformists. There has been heavy criticism from the press as well as angry reactions from Guzman's followers.

The new lineup in the prestigious Senate gives the Reformist Party--and the powerful military factions that influence it--the ability to obstruct Guzman's legislative program and to limit his control over the government bureaucracy. The Senate has exclusive authority to appoint members of the judiciary--including the chief justice, who is second in line to succeed the president. The Senate also fills key positions on the Central Electoral Commission and on the watchdog Accounting Commission, confirms all diplomatic appointments, and tries impeachment cases against public officials.

Guzman will apparently accept his party's loss of Senate seats for the sake of a peaceful transition to the presidency. Although he has introduced a legal

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challenge before the Supreme Court, he has strongly rejected proposals for a general strike and other public protests because these might serve as a pretext for military intervention. If Guzman continues to restrain the militant faction of his party, he is almost certain to be inaugurated on 16 August.

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HONDURAS: Military Sorting Out Its Role

Continuing press charges of government corruption and dishonesty have prompted the military to take measures to defuse criticism while preserving the armed forces' dominant position. These measures could backfire by provoking further attacks and disrupting military unity. Diverging viewpoints within the military are beginning to come to light as the country moves toward electing a constituent assembly and the regime grapples with the emerging political problems.

To mute accusations by the press and politicians that the armed forces were attempting to prolong their rule, the military government early this month set a firm date--20 April 1980--for the election of the constituent assembly. On the other hand, the regime assigned the responsibility for registering voters to the local municipalities, which are under the direct surveillance of regional commanders. The military thus retains control of the political and bureaucratic machinery and can distribute patronage to ensure a favorable election outcome.

In addition, the regime is drawing up its strategy for the election. Since January, Chief of State Melgar and Armed Forces Chief Paz, with the approval of the Superior Defense Council, have been meeting with leaders of the Honduran National Party to work out a political accord that will keep General Melgar at the helm. Party leaders have agreed that Melgar is their "national" candidate and realize that the military, through its regional commanders, can be of great assistance by helping the party to organize, propagandize, and register voters.

Press charges of high-level military involvement in drug trafficking, however, have placed the regime in

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a quandary. To mute criticism, a commission of military officers was organized in April to investigate the allegations, which have been particularly embarrassing to the younger officers who promised reform on their takeover of the government in 1975. The commission began its investigation vigorously and with the full support of Melgar and Paz. It slowed its pace, however, when it uncovered enough evidence to charge four high-level officers and implicate others. The commission "recommended" that the names not be revealed because public respect for the armed forces would decline and endanger the transition to a constitutional government with Melgar at its head.

Late last month, the government released a communique on the drug investigations minimizing the issue. It stated that no active duty officers had been involved in trafficking, although some may have committed irregularities in the course of their duties. No details of the probe were made public because of "legal requirements." The communique also issued a clear warning to the press to rein in its investigative reporting. Members of the Superior Defense Council have drafted a harsh new law to curb what they regard as sensationalist reporting and punish those who publish "false or distorted information." They are particularly annoyed at one daily that has strongly criticized Paz and would like to restrict its access to newsprint to bring it under control.

The proposed law may have caused dissension within the armed forces leadership. It was drafted by a select commission of military hard-liners and was passed to the cabinet with instructions that it not be changed. A majority of the Superior Defense Council is apparently behind the law and is pressing Melgar to promulgate it. The Chief of State is against the restrictions, however, because of the negative repercussions that are likely to follow. Melgar may have temporarily won his point--an armed forces statement this week suggested that any new press law would probably be held in abeyance. Demands for curbs on the media are likely to reappear, however, given the promise of future press exposes of armed forces involvement with drugs.

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Whatever steps are taken, however, the strains within the military will remain. Although they do not yet appear serious, the differences reflect emerging trends within the armed forces' hierarchy now that it is coming to grips with its political role and its relationship to civilian institutions. Its difficulties--and the stress placed on the clumsy decisionmaking process shared by the Superior Defense Council, Paz, and Melgar--are certain to increase.

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TURKEY-USSR: Economic Agreement

The draft trade agreements negotiated by Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit during his recent visit to Moscow call for a considerable expansion in bilateral trade over the next three years. The Turks will barter wheat and tungsten for Soviet oil, and the USSR plans to assist Turkey with oil, steel, and aluminum projects. The agreements establish a framework for future discussions without committing either side to specifics. Ecevit apparently rebuffed Soviet attempts to form closer political relations.

The Turks and Soviets envision boosting the value of trade between now and 1981 from roughly \$300 million to more than \$800 million. Turkey would offer wheat, textiles, and various manufactured goods in exchange for Soviet fertilizer, coking coal, iron ore, steel, and machinery. The Turks need not become dependent on the Soviets because they could reenter hard-currency markets for the commodities being traded. The trade arrangement, if fulfilled, would not seriously alter Turkey's current account deficit.

The USSR apparently also offered Turkey up to 60,000 barrels per day of petroleum between 1979 and 1981 in exchange for wheat and tungsten. The oil would be the equivalent of nearly 20 percent of Turkey's current imports of crude, but the actual amounts exchanged would depend on the quantities of wheat and tungsten available from Turkey. If prices used in setting barter quantities were roughly in line with current world market prices, Turkey's current large wheat surplus and all of its potential tungsten production would not be sufficient to pay for the Soviet oil.

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A separate protocol concerns Soviet technical assistance and equipment for oil prospecting, refinery construction, and steel and aluminum mill expansion. All of this aid would be provided under a credit arrangement signed in 1975 and raised to \$1.2 billion earlier this year; drawdowns are expected to run over the next 10 years.

The agreements will clearly strengthen economic relations between the two countries. During the same visit, however, Ecevit apparently resisted Soviet pressures to move very far toward political rapprochement. The two sides signed a bland friendship and cooperation document that essentially restates the principles of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference.

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AFGHANISTAN: KABUL ASSURES ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK OF STEPS TO PREVENT POPPY CULTIVATION IN PROPOSED PROJECT AREA. The Asian Development Bank had proposed to the Afghanistan Government that an anti-poppy clause be included as part of the draft Seraj agricultural development project agreement. Kabul rejected the idea that such assurances be made an integral part of the initial agreement but offered to prepare a separate "letter of assurances" to be signed by either an official of the Ministry of Planning or of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This side letter would assure that the Government of Afghanistan would take necessary steps, including periodic inspections and eradication measures, to prevent or eliminate opium poppy cultivation in the proposed project area. The Bank representatives have agreed to accept such a letter for the draft proposal provided the language specified also be incorporated in the final loan document if and when the Bank agrees to finance the project. [REDACTED]

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THE BAHAMAS: PRIME MINISTER "STERNLY" WARNS BAHAMIANS AGAINST BECOMING INVOLVED IN DRUG SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES. According to the Embassy in Nassau, Prime Minister Pindling appeared on television on 10 July, as part of his participation in the Bahamian Independence Day celebration, and included a warning that the Bahamas faces no less than "an invasion of illegal immigrants and drug smugglers." He sternly warned Bahamians not to become involved with these illegal activities. The Prime Minister noted that drug smugglers are exploiting the numerous unguarded and unmanned airstrips which are located on nearly every major island of the archipelago, due largely to the inability of the Bahamian Marine Police and Defense Force to adequately guard the vast Bahamian borderline which encompasses 6,000 miles of land and 100,000 square miles of open water. He also chided his television audience that much of the smugglers success is due to the "extensive cooperation" that they are receiving from certain elements among the Bahamians themselves. [REDACTED]

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BURMA: GOVERNMENT CRACKDOWN ON GENERAL SMUGGLING IN SOUTHERN BURMA SHOULD ALSO RESTRICT MOVEMENT OF NARCOTICS THROUGH THIS AREA. Although not specifically aimed at the illicit narcotics trade in the Golden Triangle, the current Burmese crackdown on smuggling by boat from Burmese coastal ports will also have a dampening effect on any narcotics traffickers planning to use this route to move narcotics out of Burma and into world markets. There has been widespread speculation in recent months concerning the potential importance of the Tenasserim coastal route, but there has been no hard evidence of any significant movement of narcotics over this route. The Embassy in Rangoon notes that the emergence of Penang as a key transit point for the flow of Golden Triangle opiates to Western Europe underscores the need for accurate reporting on seaborne trafficking from Burma and Thailand; but it notes further that American observers have thus far been unable to uncover any evidence of such movement.

For several months now the Burmese Government has been increasing its efforts to reduce the movement of all contraband in southern Burma. Military personnel and civilian authorities have been ordered to take a more active role in the suppression of smugglers in the south, and additional Customs inspectors have been assigned to the area. But the Burmese, themselves, do not believe that narcotics trafficking is a serious problem in the southern coastal area, and, thus far, there has been no reported seizure of narcotics in connection with the government crackdown. Nonetheless, the restricted movement of boats and ships, especially local schooners, between Burma, Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia will also limit the potential movement of narcotics along these routes.

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EGYPT: MAJOR POLICE RAID IN REMOTE AREA NETS OPIUM AND WEAPONS. According to a press report from Cairo, a security force of some 300 policemen raided an area in central Egypt last week and arrested more than 300 people. The raid took place about 200 miles south of Cairo at the Nile River village of Beni Muhammadiyat and in the surrounding hills and caves that for generations have served as hideouts for smugglers and racketeers. According to the press account, the police confiscated opium valued at an estimated \$3,000,000 along with about 3,500 assorted weapons including some automatics. The police also reportedly found more than 20 acres of opium poppies. Some of the automatic and semiautomatic weapons seized were said to have been made in Israel; many of the rifles were reported to be more modern than those used by the police. The local Cairo press notes that the raid was the first in 10 years during which a strong police force has penetrated the traditionally "lawless" area. 

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LAOS: LAOTIAN GOVERNMENT REPORTEDLY INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS TRAFFIC. According to a recent Defense Attache report from Bangkok, a source, whom he personally regards as "very reliable" and having excellent access to this type of information, claims to have "incontrovertible proof" that the Laotian Government is actively supporting the manufacture and sale of illicit drugs. Although there have been previous reports during the past year alleging the involvement of Laotian officials in narcotics trafficking this is the first that is claimed to be based on "incontrovertible proof," although that proof apparently has not yet been offered. 

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BAHRAIN--Increase in Drug Smuggling--TNDD, No. L/7876, 7 July 1978, p. 72. Narcotics smuggling into Bahrain has increased to the point of "becoming a menace to the general public" according to local judicial authorities. The Bahrain civil courts reportedly try three or four drug cases per month, most of them involving the importation of hashish from India and Pakistan. Under the Bahrain drug ordinances, the court can sentence a person convicted of drug smuggling to up to 10 years in prison, depending on the amounts involved and the way in which it was brought into the country.

BOLIVIA--The Cocaine Routes--TNDD, No. L/7876, pp. 46-47. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, the coca harvest in 1976 reached 13,000 tons and was grown on 10,000 hectares. In 1977 the harvest reached 15,600 tons from 12,000 hectares. In economic terms this suggests an annual growth rate of 20 percent--which, the press points out, is not in line with the population growth. (This is somewhat less than the total area in Bolivia that is reported by other sources to be under coca cultivation.) A qualified member of the National Drugs Directorate has stated that Bolivia produced a total of 17 tons of cocaine in 1977, of which only 300 kilograms were seized by the police. He also said that the revenue from the marketing of cocaine was more than \$80 million. He admitted, however, that these figures are no more than estimates and that the true size of this traffic could be considerably greater. The Bolivian press points out that the argument that coca has been used for ages by certain Bolivian peasant groups does not explain the increased cultivation; official data confirm that this farming activity is growing much faster than the population itself.

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BULGARIA--GDR Journal Reports Narcotics Arrest Data--  
TNDD, No. L/7876, pp. 44-45. The international highway running through Bulgaria is one of the routes of narcotics smuggling from the Middle and Far East to Western Europe, particularly to West Germany and the Netherlands, to France and from there to the US. The article appearing in the East German press claims that from 1 January 1969 to 30 June 1977, a total of about 21,000 kilograms--21 tons--of narcotics, including 315 kilograms of morphine, were confiscated from people traveling through Bulgaria and intended for secret transport across the border. (The bulk of these seizures apparently was hashish in one form or another.) The East German press is quick to point out that drug addiction is not a domestic problem for Bulgaria itself and that no Bulgarian citizens or Bulgarian vehicles are involved in the traffic.

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COLOMBIA--Twenty Pounds of Cocaine Found on Military Aircraft--TNDD, No. L/7886, p. 45. Alleged members of the Colombian armed forces have again been implicated in drug trafficking with the discovery of a cocaine shipment in the hold of a military cargo plane about to take off from Leticia Airport. This is the third case in which alleged military and paramilitary men have allegedly been involved in drug trafficking. According to the press item, as of the date of the article, no one had actually been arrested; however, arrests were expected on the basis of clues that had been found.

COLOMBIA--Two Successful Cocaine Raids Described--TNDD, No. L/7876, pp. 54-56. Judicial police and special agents recently discovered a cocaine processing laboratory and seized a total of 2,780 grams of alkaloid. Initially the agents, after a series of investigations, seized 100 grams of ready-for-sale cocaine in a camper. A few minutes later in connection with the same case, the agents raided a house in which they discovered a cocaine processing laboratory and an additional 180 grams of cocaine of high purity. The same day--both seizures in late May--the police seized 2,500 grams of pure cocaine at Eldorado airport. The cocaine was being

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carried in a false-bottomed suitcase by a Colombian traveling on a Lufthansa flight from Lima, Peru.

CYPRUS--Drug Smuggling Sentences--TNDD, No. L/7876, p. 77. The Famagusta High Criminal Court has sentenced one Turk to four years in jail and another to one year in jail and a fine on charges of possessing and importing "narcotics substances." The drugs consisted of hemp and cannabis resin. One of the smugglers was from Iskenderun, Turkey, and had been arrested on similar charges last year.

EGYPT--Frontier Forces Seize 3.5 Tons of "Narcotics"--TNDD, No. L/7886, p. 81. The frontier guard and intelligence forces recently seized a narcotics shipment valued at about \$22.9 million as it was being smuggled into Egypt from the buffer zone in the Sinai. The shipment consisted of 78 packages of "raw narcotics" weighing 3.5 tons. Seven Arabs, all residents of the occupied territories, were arrested. (This would be a very large seizure, especially if it were raw opium; there has been no confirmation of this alleged seizure.)

EGYPT--Opium and Hashish Seized at Suez--TNDD, No. L/7876, pp. 73-74. According to the Egyptian press, members of the antinarcotics forces recently seized 2,340 bundles of hashish weighing 1.6 tons hidden inside 17 rolls of wire cable. The seizure was estimated to be worth about \$4-million. An Egyptian official in Beirut observed the placing of the drugs in the wire rolls and accompanied the shipment to Port Sudan to be camouflaged and then re-shipped to Suez. The hashish was grown in Lebanon and packaged in Egypt. The Lebanese smuggler involved, described by the press as "the most dangerous Lebanese drug smuggler," had been deported previously from Egypt and was forbidden to return. Six packages of pure opium, weighing 7.5 kilograms, were also found in the same shipment.

GHANA--Arrests in West Germany for Marijuana Trafficking--TNDD, No. L/7876, p. 76. Fifty-three Ghanaians were arrested by the West German authorities for various offenses in marijuana trafficking during the period June 1974 to November 1977, according to a press

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item from Accra. Forty of the 53 are still serving prison terms ranging from one to seven years. In another development, Liberian authorities also have arrested, tried, and jailed 12 Ghanaians for drug trafficking.

HONG KONG--Major Seizure of Acetic Anhydride Revealed-- TNDD, No. L/7886, p. 19. Narcotics Bureau detectives in Hong Kong seized a "massive cache" of a chemical used in the production of opium during a recent raid on a heroin "factory" according to the South China Morning Post for 14 June. The cache, amounting to 704 pounds of acetic anhydride--enough to produce a ton of heroin--was found in a seabed-search in Tathong Channel. Valued at almost \$450,000, the cache was the second recovered from the sea in four days; a third part of the consignment is believed to be still unaccounted for. The shipment of acetic anhydride is believed to have been dropped by a fishing junk in the channel to be picked up later by Hong Kong traffickers. The chemical was found by two Royal Navy divers in 50 feet of water about 300 yards off shore and about three miles from the previous find.

MALAYSIA--Drug Problem Seen as National Threat-- TNDD, No. L/7886, p. 22. According to the Welfare Services Minister, the Malaysian Government is determined to contain the drug problem because, if left unchecked, "it will retard the nation's economic and social progress and educational development" as well as endanger the country's security. The minister was speaking at a recent seven-day workshop on the Reduction of Demand for Illicit Drugs in Southeast Asia being held at the Universiti Sains Malaysia. The university's vice chancellor said that he understood that the World Health Organization had decided to use the university as an international data center for research on the epidemiology of drug dependence.

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PORTUGAL--Drug Addiction--TNDD, No. L/7876, p. 78. The Lisbon Center for Drug Studies has indicated in a recent report that more than 100,000 persons in Portugal take drugs. Reportedly these are mostly school children. According to the report, marijuana is the most commonly used drug, but cocaine is becoming more and more prevalent. Drug traffickers in Portugal may be sentenced to eight to 10 years in prison.

SPAIN--Drug Consumption on the Increase--TNDD, No. L/7876, pp. 79-81. Hashish and amphetamines are being used in most of Madrid's secondary schools, according to the Spanish Union to Combat Drug Use. Both sexes are involved between the ages of 12 and 18. This "avalanche" of drug use is reported to affect all social classes. The report also notes that the age of beginning drug use is becoming constantly younger. A few years ago the starting age was 17 or 18; it reportedly is now down to 12 or 13. The Union to Combat Drug Use, which is strongly family-oriented, appears to be expanding rapidly throughout Spain's urban areas.

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